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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondents do not controvert the statement of
facts of the appellants so far as the same are stated~ but
the respondents desire to supplement by further statement
of facts .
The property of the appellants was located partly in
Davis County and partly in Salt Lake Connty, containing
a total of 8.63 acres of land. The State Road Commission

commenced two separate suits~ one in Salt Lake Colll1ty~
Civil No~ 105534, in which suit \Vas included 8~01 acres
and the other action in Davis County, Civil No. 6132, in
which was included .62 acres which was owned by the
appellant subject to a right of \Vay in favor of North Salt
Lake. The State Road Commission fiJcd the action in Salt
Lake CoWity on Jrme 30~ 1955 and the action in Davis
County on November 3, 1955.
1

The Salt Lake County case, Civil No. 105534~ is exhibit
H3P" in the instant action and Civi1 !\'"o~ 6132 in Davis
County) is exhibit u2pu_ Herbert B. Maw made an appearance in both cases for the appellants and filed an answer
1

in the Salt Lake Cormty case on December 12, 1955, praying
for judgment on $275t000.00 plus interest. Ivlr. Ma\v made
his first apearancc for the appellants in the Salt Lake County case on July 20, 1955J and in the Davis County case on
November 21~ 1955.

The agreement for employment of attorneys which appears as exhibit .c~1D' and is set forth in appendix A of
appellants brieft was dated January 12, 1956.
1

The Salt Lake County Case was first tried before a
jury who returned a verdict on April 7, 195G, of $150,000.00
and judgment upon the verdict was entered May 14, 1956~
but the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court of the
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State of Utah and reversed for new trial. The second trial
of the cause \vas before a jmy who returned a verdict on
April 9, 1958, of S175,000~ 00, and upon refusal of the State
to accept a settlement upon remittitur of S35j000~00, judgment was entered for $175~000.00 plus interest in the fur ..
ther sum of $28~520.98, from which judgment the State
appealed. However1 pending appeal the State paid on Jtme 5,
1958t the sum of $72 000.00 to the I\'obles, this being the
highest appraisal placed upon the property by the State.
In an opinion filed J\.tarch 2, 1959, the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah held that the evidence supported a judg·
ment of $140,000.00 with interest and costs. On March 17,
1959~ judgment \\~"as entered in favor of the I\"!obles and
against the State of "Ctah for $93t093.37 as the balance due
in the Salt Lake County case.
The Davis County case "~as set Ued by stipulation and
judhrment was entered on }1atch 5j 1957~ in the sum of
$1:P975.00 in full settlement lnc1uding all interest, costs and
c1aims of every natu:re. (E.xhibit ~'2P")
By \vay of further statement of facts, the respondents
quote fi~om the findings of fact of the Trial Court: (R 70)
1

the amount recovered in Civil No. 6132
in Davis County~ Utah 'vas .$1)975.00, which sum was
paid to the defendants. The amount recovered in Civil No. 105534 in Salt Lake County was $169~593.37.
The total amormt recovered from the State of Utah
from said condemnation proceedings was the sum of
'~That

$171~578.37+

That according to the terms of said agreement
between the plaintiffs and defendants~ the fee due
the plaintiffs is computed as follows:
(a) 15~-c of amounts over $80,000..

to
(b) 25% of amotu1ts over

to

$90~000~ =

$90~000.

$11o~ooo. =

$1~590~00

$5 Jooo.oo
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(c) 30{/c ~f amounts over $110,000.

.

to $120:.00Ct

(d) 507o of amourit over $120,000.
to 5171,578~37 or $50,578.37_

=

==

. $3)000.00

825]789.18

Total fee due plaintiff $35,289.18
That the defendants have paid to the plaintiffs
the sum of $24,038.60, leaving a balance due to the
plaintiffs under the terms of said agreement the smn
of $11 ~250.58.''
Counsel for the appellants stated to the "Trial Court
that there was no dispute about the work done by the re-.
spondents ( R 24) ~ and that there was no question that the
attorneys went to the Supreme Court nvice and brought
.excellent results ( R 26) ~

POINT I
THE CONTRACT FOR EMPLO'Yl\1ENT OF A TTORNEYS WAS NOT AlVIBIGUOUS AND AS CONSTRUED
BY THE TRIAL COURT, CORRECTLY REFLECTS THE
INTENTION OF TilE PARTIES.
Respondents acknowledge that if the contract between
an attorney and client is ambiguous wherein one of thereasonable interpretations of the contract would result in
an injustice to the c1ient_. then meaning should be given to
the contract whlch results in doing justice to the cl icnt.
However~ in the instant case~ the contract was not ambiguous and the interpretation of the contract
given by the
trial court does not work an injustice upon the client, since
the client acknowledged that the attorneyst services \Vere
substantial and satisfactory and made no claim that the
resulting fee to the attorneys was in any way excessive.
The case of Pinto v. Seely, 22 Cal. App. 318~ 135 P. 43,
(App. Br. 8) ~ after stating that any ambiguity should be
construed most favorably to the interests of the client also
added the following:

a."
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HWe do not understand~ however, that the rule
in this be half is so inflexible that it may be invoked

to perpetra tc a palpable injustice) or that it calls for
a construction of such contract beyond the express
covenants of the parties~' t

The case of Waugh et al v. Q4 & C. Co4 et alt CCA 7th
(1926) 16 F. 2d 363 cited by (Appr Brr 8) ~ in fact found
the agreement fair and unambiguous~
Before considering in detail the case law t we refer to
Webster's New International DictionaryJ Second Edition,
1938, the meaning given to the words j:~Recover/~ and ~~Re
covery~J:

:
14~
LA\V. To gain as compensation: to obtain in return for injury or debt; as, to recover damages in trespass; to recover debt and costs in a suit
at la\v; to obtain title to or possession of something
by final decree or judgment in a court of la\v; as to
recover lands in ejectment or real action; to gain by
legal process; a.';~ to recover judgment against a
defendant.
'~~=Recover''

'"Recover~/~ :

7. LAW. The obtaining in a suit at law of a
right to sometl1ing by a verilict, decree or judgment
of court, esp. by the final one deciding the issues
involved; specif. a common recovery. A final recov ..
ery is one obtained by a verdict or final decree or
judgment. Its total is the sum awarded and docs not
include interest after the verdict or decision.
A layman referring to Webster's Dictionary could easily
determine that all interest up to the time of final verdict,
judgment or decision is included in the \Vords '~ recovert ~ or
"'recovery'~ t and more certain1y would be included in the
words ''amounts recovered"" and •"any amolUlts recoveredu~
which being in the plural must embrace interest as well as
principal.
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POINT II

INTEREST AWARDED IN A CONDEJ1N/JtTION
SUIT IS FOUNDED UPON THE SAME CASES AND
REASONING AS INTEREST UPON CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS IN GEXERAL.

Respondents do not dispute the contention of the appellants in Point II ( App, Br 9) that interest a,,_, a rdcd jn
a condemnation suit is a\varded as a matt.er of right and
not as a matter of judicial discretion, \Vhere allowable.
This means, however, that interest \vi11 be a'varded, allowed,
and paid:t only at such time as the claim for the principal
is fully established, and hen it is so establishcd the in tc rest
becomes as much a part of the recovery as the principal
and is in eluded in the final judgmentr
The case of Fen v . Union Pacific Railroad Co.:t 32 L"":tah
101J 88 P. 1003:t cited by the {App. Br. 9) \Vas a suit to
recover damages for the injury to livestock which were
injured while in transit. The trial court entered judgment
for the damages plus interest on the damages from the date
of injury~ \l'hich judgment was affirmed on appeal, the
court holding in the last paragraph of its opinion as foil ows:
+

'v

HThe true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before judgment in a given
case or not is~ thereforcj not \vhether the damages
are unliquidated or otherwise, but \vhethcr the injury and consequent damages arc complete and must
be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and kno,vn standards of value, 'vhich the court or jury must follo\v
in fixmg the amountt rather than be guided by their
best judgment in assessing the amormt to be allo\ved
for past as well as for future injury~ or for elements
that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of
value. The same rule under the same conditions
would of necessity apply to actions for breach of
9
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contract. This is illustrated by some of the California cases, as well as by the Nevada case cited by
cOWlsel for appellant. As the case at bar falls clearly
within the rule where the amount is computed as
of a fixed time, and in accordance with fixed rules
of evidence as to value~ the court did not err in
computing~ on the amormt of damages found, inter..
est at the legal ra ie ~
The judgment therefore is affirmed, with costs.'~
In the case of Oregon SJwrtline Railroad Co. v. Jones,
29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732, where no occupancy or possession
had been taken of the land until after judgment, the landO\\'ner contended they were entitled to interest from the
date of the summons. The court held that the lando\Vller
was not entitled to interest from the date of the summons,
but if at all, only from the date of occupancy~ We quote
from the last paragraph of the opinion of the court:
'~=To allow appeJ Ian ts' claim of interest to prevail, we arc obliged to read something into the sta ..
tute not fonnd there~ Nor does it come within uny
of the rules of the cases where interest has been aJlowed. Here there has been no entry or occupation
of the property~ :\or was there any time prior to the
verdict of the jury when the amormt of plaintiff~s
liability had been determined. Xor was there any
time \Vhen it could have taken possession and given a
writ of assistance therefor until final judgment and
order of condemnation. And the authorities seem
to be that one or more of these things must be shown
to entitle the landowner to interest. 'J
In the case of Kimba.n v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253~
90 Pac. 395. 'vhere the landov.rner claimed interest from
the city for damages caused by change of grade of a street
by the city. the court in follo\ving the case of Fell v ~ Union
Pacific Railroad allowed interest on damages found as of
the date of completion of the change of gTade, stating that
this allowance of interest on a claim for unliquidated da·
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mages is based on the contract principles annormced in Fell
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
The case of the Salt Lake and Utah Railroad Co~ ~ .
Schramm et aJ .. ~ 56 Utah 53~ 189 Pac. 90, the court held
that the landowner was entitled to interest from the date
of the order of occupancy and not from the date of the
commencement of the action, following the case of Oregon
Shoctline Railroad Co. v+ Jones~ and the Supreme Court
ordered the judgment modified to a11ow interest on the
verdict from the date of occupancy rather than the date
of commencement of the action.

The foregoing review of the Utah decisions \vould seem
to indicate that interest allowed in condemnation suits is
based upon contract principles and that such interest as
accrues from the date of occupancy or injury is included
in the judgment.
POINT III
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AS SHOWN BY
THE CONTRACT WAS THAT THE WORDS ~~AlVIOUNTS
RECOVEREDt~ AND ~~ANY AMOUNT RECOVERED!'
IN EFFECT MEAN AMOUNTS COLLECTED~ WHETHER INTEREST OR PRINCIPAL.
The appellants seek to exclude all interest on the first
$80 ~000.00 of the principal, and apparently base their contention upon the unfonnded asswnption that the State had
set aside $80,000.00 as an award to the defendants prior to
condemnation.
As appears from exhibit ''3P!t, Civil No. 105534:r the
SaJt Lake Cormty case~ condemnation proceedings were filed June 30~ 1955; \vhereas the agreement \"Vith the attorneys
was dated January 12~ 1956. If, in fact:t the appellants had
11
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been offered $80,000~00 before June 30J 1955, and if the appellants had really intended to exclude interest from the amounts recovered they should have commenced the division
of the fees at S82 ,400. 00 to include interest which had accrued from Jrme 30, 1955, to January 12, 1956jthe date of the
agreement. Furthermore, the appellants elected to gamb]e
\Vhen they refused to accept the $80~000~00 from the State
of Utah by way of settlement. As shown by the record in
Civil No. 105534, the State appraisers had appraised the
property of the appellants at $57~000.00 and 872~000.00 respectively. Thus the appellants had n"O assurance that they
""~ouJd receive even $80~000+00 principal and interest~ Also,
as in all litigationf a Jump sum settlement by \Vay of compromise ''rithout trial was probable, jn \vhich event the settle . .
mcnt figure would have included interest and principal
without distinction as to whether interest or principal were
being compromised. In fact the Davis County case was
scttl cd on ~VIa rch 5~ 1957, for $1,975.00 including interest
and cosl';, (exhibit 2P) .
\Vc no'v review the cases cited by the appellants deal-

ing \vith contingent fee contracts based upon recovery or

similar terms. Sanders v. RiddichJ 127 Ten. 700, 156 S. W.
464, was a case \Vhere the client employed the attorneys in
a damage suit \Vherein no interest \Vas contemplated to be
included in the judgment, under 001 agreement as follo\-'"l"~s:
~~1,

W. B. Sanders, hereby employ IVIarion G.
Evans and T. K. Riddich as my attorneys to represent me in my suit against Memphis Street Rai1way,
and I hereby agree that tl1ey may retain as their fee
one-third of the recovery in case the same if"i tmder
$12,000.00 and one-fourth in case the same is
$12/100.00 or over.n

The trial court construed the agreement in favor of the
attorneys saying that the interest which accrued after
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judgment would not be considered part of the recovery to
defeat the attorneys one-third fee and require the attorney
to take one .. fourth . It is to be noted here that at the time
the agreement was made the attorneys and client did not
anticipate any interest to be included in the recovery;P this
being a personal injmy matter.
The case of Covert v. Randles (App. Br. 13) \vas also
decided in favor of the attorneys in a case where the client
employed the attorneys to recover approximately $41~000 . 00
worth of bonds \Vhich were stolen from her and she
agreed to pay 8~i of the amount recovered up to the
sum of $20,000.00) and 59~ of the balance recovered. About
$24~500 .00 worth of bonds \V hich included accrued interest,
\Vere impormdcd in the United States District Court at
Los Angeles and about S7,000.00 in the United States District Court for Arizona~ leaving about $10:r000. 00 in the
hands of thieves or persons who had purchased the same
from the thieves~ The attorneys, by way of compromise
before judgmentt obtained the bonds from the district court
and approximately S4j000.00 of the other bonds. The client
contended they tverc not entitled to any fee because the
word ~~recovered~j required judgment and execution~ The
court quoted from 53 Corpus Juris 655~ Section Onet as
follO\VS:

'•Recover. (sec. 1) A~ In Broad General Sense.
To co11ect; to come into possession of; to get~ obtain,
procure, receivc ~ ~ md the like; * **
(Sec~ 2)

B. In Narro\ver Legal Sense the term
has a well defined meaning; and has been variously
defined as to be successful in a suit; to collect or
obtain the amount, possibly by a suit at Jaw; to
have judgment; to obtain a favorable or final judgment; to obtain by course of la 'v; to obtain by judicial action or proceeding~ or in any legal manner;
H

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to obtain by means of an action~ in contrast to voluntary payment; to obtain title to by final decree or
judgment in a court of law; to succeed in an actiont
or in a law suit; and in this 1egal sense., it has been
held not to include neccessarily, or even ordinarilyJ
the actual payment of the money sued for.''
The Arizona court did not seek to give the word '~recover~'
the narrow meaning suggested by the text quoted, and
stated that the intent of the parties governs~ and tl it ap ..
pears from the contract that the parties intended the word
''recover~' as used therein should mean the same as to collect, (to come into possession oft to get~ etc . ' we should so
construe it.. The court then affirmed the judgment which
granted the attorneys their percentage upon all of the bonds
that they recovered~ whether by suit or otherwise. Under
comment nine, the court stated that the compensation of
the attorney should be based on the cash value of the bonds,
and not the par value~ and as such the cash value of the
bonds necessarily included the accrued interest.
t

The case of Bassford v+ Johnson, 172 N.Y. 488t 65 N.E~
260 (App. Br. 14) where the lando~er agreed to pay the

attorney

'~10~'o

of whatever award may be obtained for my
land~', the appellate court awarded the attorney 109C. of all
interest as well as the principal amount of the award. The
Bassford case conclusively holds that interest do\Vll to
date of payment is included in the award for the ptrrpOSes
of the attorneys fee. For the appellants to contend that the
instant case should be considered as if an award of
$140~000~00 had been made on July 30~ 1955, is to substitute
in the contract for the words "~amounts recovered'' the word
''verdict.~' If the contract had been for a prorated share of
the verdict then the reasoning of the appellants would apply.
It will be seen in this case that the jury verdict was
$175,000.00., to which interest was to be added; however~
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this was in no sense the amotmt recovered, since until the
Supreme Court made its decision, and the State of Utah
rnade payment, the amount was not recovered.
In the case of Smith v. Whitman, 159 Md. 478, 150 A.
856 (App. Br. 15) the court found the agreement was for
•~one . . third of the amormt they might recover for the defendants, less the sum of $3~000.00 which had been a\varded
to the defendants by the Aberdeen Proving Ground Land
Commission . . . '' A careful reading of this case shows the
facts to be that the attorneys had told the clients at the
outset~ that no interest was recoverable on their claim
against the government, so that the parties contracted
without anticipating any interest to be a part of the recovery. The total final award was $63,500~00 principalJ and
$42, 572~29 interest, making a total of $106J072. 29. The trial
court granted a prayer for directed verdict of the attorneys
wherein it deducted $3,000.00 p1us interest on said $3~000.00
from the total award before giving the attorneys their
one-third~ However, this case \vas reversed because the
trial court did not permit the jury to find the facts stated in
the attorneys' prayer~ Thus the appellate court never did
pass upon the question of whether the $3~000~ 00 p1us interest was to be excluded, and this $3,000.00 pius interest was
volunteered by the attorneys to be excluded by their O\Vll
prayer. The appellate court, at the close of comment three,
stated:

''The suit was upon a con tract whereby the p1 aintiffs
were to be paid a contingent fee of one-thlrd of the amormt
recovered~ which amount, in our opinion~ included not only
the sum awarded to the rrustees for the land taken and
the damage to the other lands caused by such taking, but
also the amount received as interest thereon~ and the right
of the plaintiffs to recover one-third of the entire amolUltJ
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principal and interest, a warded to the trustees was in no
\Vay af fcctcd by the fact that the plaintiffs at one time
told the defendants that in their opinion no interest could be
collected upon their claim~~'
l-Ienee, the courts never did pass upon the question as to
whether or not the interest on the first S3t000 ~00 ""ra~ to be
included or excluded from the contract under an agreement
as \~.rordcd above, and in fact the portion of the opinion
quoted above sho\VS tl1at the appellate court felt the attorneys cnti tied to one-third of the entire amonnt of principal
and interest.
It is q ucstionable that appellants are serious in their
contention that to allow attorneys interest on this $80,000.00
is unconcionable, \loh P.U the facts are that the attorneys put
in daub le the 'vork contemplated, with t\vo trials and t\vice
before the Supreme CoW"t. In fact, the only \vay such extra
\VOrk may be even partly compensated is by allowing interest on this part of amount rccoveredj which the contract~
under any reasonable meaning, surely included. Also from
the total amount recovered in the sum of 8171 j578~37, the
attorneys claimed only .$35,289. 18, leaving the clients
$136j289. 19.
POINT IV

EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS)' BOTH
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED AS A
]dA.TfER OF LEGAL RIGHT, HOVVEVER~ THE AMOUNT
OF EACH AND THE RECOVERY THEREOF IS ONLY
ACCOMPLISHED WITH EFFORT~
I;{

The appellants in point IV of their brief regard interest as a matter of legal \vindfall which is obtained without
effort once the value of the land at the time of the taking
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is determined. Certainly interest cou1d not be recovered
without litigating the matter of principal, and although the
law is now established that the O\vner is entitled to interest
in certain cases as a matter of legal right, nevertheless~ it
requires the efforts of the attorneys to assert such legal
right. The matter of interest in eminent domain proceedings
has been the subject of 1itigation in this state which has
established the rules pertaining to the award of interest in
absence of an express statute awarding interest in eminent
domain proceedings. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co. v Jones
(supra ------------) stated the rule that interest \vas not allo\ved
from the date of summons~ but would be alio\ved only from
the date of occupancy. In Kimball v. Salt Lake City (supra
. ·-·~· -~ ~ ___ ) this court held that the 1andowner was en ti t1 ed to
interest from the date the street improvements \Vere com..
plcted in changing the grade of the street, as a matter of
legal right; but this legal right was not established \\tithout
litigation. In the case of State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 2G5
P. 2d 630 (1953) the court held that it was not violative
of the constitutional provision that '~private property shaH
not be taken or damaged fot public use without just compensation~' to disallow interest in condenmati on proceedings
after service of summons but before occupancy. There is
.:m inference here that if interest is allo\ve d from the date
of occupancy, the denial thereof \\"'ould be a taking of the
property without just compensation as such interest is considered part of compensation for the 1and taken4
Considering now some of the cases cited in point IV
of the appellants brief, the case of People v. Kelly (App. Br.
19) was a case in which the landowners had already obtabted a judgment against the city for land condemned by
the city~ and the interest in the controversy arose upon and
after the judgment. The judgment itself was paidj but interest on the judgment accruing after the date of the judg-
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ment was not pai~. The legislature authorized the city to
issue bonds to pay matured .lfonds and judgment debts. Th.e
appellate .co~ held that the interest on the_ judgment \vas
not authorized by the legislature to be paid from the new
bonds. Under comments three and four the court said:
is to be observed that two classes of interest
are contemplated by the statute, i. er, that which
accrues prior to the judgment} and interest which
accrues after the judgment is entered~ Interest a.e·
cruing before judgment is exprcssJy made a part of
the judgment, but no such provision is made as
to interest accruing on a judgment after it is entered.''
'~It

Thus the holding in the case of People v. KelJy when considering the portion quoted by the appellant and the portin quoted by the respondents indicates that the court considered interest accruing before judgment as being part of
the value of the land taken.
The case of HollingstVorth v~ Lewis (App. Br~ 19} in
addition to the portion quoted by the a ppe1lants~ said:
very short, we are asked to determine the
length and breadth of the meanillg of the word
'refunds' as used in the contract executed by the
~'In

parties~''

Then quoting \Vebster's Dictionary they fonnd the word
HrcfliDdn means to repay. The court then further stated:
''As the defendants never paid any interest to
the railroad company~ in no proper sense can it be
said that any railroad company ~ ~ . repaid (that is
refunded) any interest money. By the terms of the
con tract executed by the parties, the plaintiff \vas
never authorized to receive 50~--~ of all moneys colIected.'t
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By implication, the court held that if the contract had been
for 50 ~/C. of al 1 moneys collected J it \Vo uld have included

interest.
In the case of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v.
Coachman (APP~ Br. 21) the court was construing a statute
relating to claims against common carriers for damage or
overcharge in connection \vith freight carried. The statuto
p

required the carrier to pay claims \vithin 60 days from
presentation and upon failure to do so
be Hable to the claimant for the amount of
his claim and fifty per cent per annum interest on
the principal sum of said claim from date of filing
. . . and \Vhen the said claimant shall bring suit
and recover judgment for his claim against said
common carrier, he ~hall be allowed the said fifty
per cent per annum in addition to the principal sum
of said claim, and the same shall be a llo\ved in the
verdict giving him judgment; . ~ . in the event that
the claimant shall prevail in an action to recover
on his cia im, [the carrier shall J be liable for a reasonable attorney:t s fee . . . \vhich shall be fixed by
the court, not to exceed fifteen dollars if the amotmt
recovered docs not exceed one hundred doUars:t and
not to exceed fifteen per cent on any amount recovered greater than the swn of one hundred dollars..n
~~shall

The court said the intent of the statute was not to- allow
attorney:t s fees upon the fifty per cent interest, saying:
''Especially is this clear in that part of the statute providing that attorney's fee shaU be fixed by
the court, not to exceed fifteen dollars if the amolUlt
recovered does not exceed one hundred dollars.''

The court construed this particular statutory use of
recoveredtJ to exclude interest.

'~amount
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W c now cite to the court other cases which construe
the term.s ~-trecover'' or ~"recovery~'.
Manzo v.

Dullea~

96 F. 2d 135, Second Circuit Court
( 1938), 116 A.L.R. 1241. An attorney agreed \vith the
client to sue to recover on an insurance policy upon a retainer agreement of 25?·i of any amount recovered by trial~
or 20?n of any amount realized by settlement. Judgment
was recovered consisting of S13:t500.00 damages pius 8919.42
interest plus $164.87 costs~ From this amonnt a mortgagee
was first paid, leaving a check of $9,423.06. The attorney
claimed a fee based upon the full recovery of S15,429.33,
but the client contended he should only get a fee based upon the $9,423r06, which was the net amount of the check~
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the attorney was
entitled to one. f otu"th of the 815~ 429.33 :t including the costs.
Vaughan v~ Humphreys, Ark~ (1922)J 239 S.W. 730t
22 A.L.R. 1201. In this case the attorney contracted to bring
suit against a life insurance company and to receive as
compensation 40?o of the recovery. Judgment was obtained
against the insurance company for $5,000. 00, plus accrued
interest, and attorneys fees as allowed by the statute were
fixed by the court at $500.00. The attorney claimed that he
was entitled to the entire $500.00 attorneyts fee, plus 40~·'a
of the rest of the recovery. Trial judge a\varded the attorney
40% of all of the recovery, which included $5000.00 plus
the accrued interest, plus $500.00 attorney~s fees. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court saidt Wlder comment two:

The legal meaning of the word urecovery!' is
the obtaining of a thing by the judgment of the
court as a result of an action brought for the purpose~ The contract under consideration provides that
the attorney shall have 40 ~(: of the recovery~ This
( 2)
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means 40% of the amount recovered by the policy
holder which, as we have seen~ includes the amount
of the attorney's fee a1lowed by the statute to the
policy holder~ under the statute this is as much a
part of the recovery of the policy holder as is the
face of the policy and the penalty provided by the

statute.n
POINT V
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ANY SUM ADVANCED PLAINTIFFS~ AND
IF OTHERWISE ENTITLED TO INTEREST, THEY
WAIVED THE SAME AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.

the State Road Conunission paid to
the defendants the sum of $72,000.00, pending appeal of the
cause to this court following the second trial, to apply towards any final recovery in the cause. (R23) From this
$72,000.00~ the defendants paid the attorneys $3,500.00
and retained the balance.
On June

5~ 1958~

It is conceded that if the recovery had not exceeded
872,000~00 the attorneys would be required to repay the
$3,500.00 pius interest thereon; h o\vever ~ the recovery having been ~171,568437j the advance payment by the State
should have been considered as an advance payment on
the final recovery in the cause, and as such, the attorneys
\VOUld have been entitled to their proportionate share of
the S72,000.00 when received. The appellants (App. Br~ 22)
concede that the $3,000.00 paid to the attorneys was advance attorneys' fees.
At the close of arguments before the trial court the
discussion concerned whether or not the attorneys were
entitled to interest on the balance claimed for attorneys~
fees since the defendants had deposited $12t000~00 \Vith the
clerk as a bond to guarantee payment of the services. The

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-court inquired whether counsel wanted t}:le court to·consider
interestt and· the .following discussion· is taken from the
additional transeript of ·preceedings made by B+ M. Goodpasture, the court :reporter.:

THE

COL"RT~

Well, I want to know ·something

about what you want me to do~ to decide on that
phase~ because ~~e will just come back to another
feature here that will have to be heard.
I\ffi. FADEL: Your HonorJ since the time is
so short ·r \vould say ·that we could make thls determination~ not eonsidering any interest on the attorneys~ · fe~s.

MR+ COTRO-MANES: \\re waive interestt your
Honor, on ours.
TilE COURT: One way·or the other?
MR. COTRO-MANES: That's right.

THE COURT: Just these figures that you have
submitted here. I will have to look at some of your
cases.
At the hearing on the objections of the defendants to
the findings of fact, the trial court stated to counsel that
the court \Vas of the opinion that the court was relieved of
considering the question of interest claimed by either parties on the balance due for attorneys' fee or interest on advanced attorneys~ fees. Even if the trial court were mistaken, and the defendants were in fact, entitled to interest.
the total amotmt as claimed by them on page 23 of their
brief is .$161.00, which would scarcely require or justify
a new trial. Furthermore~ the defendants had the use of
$2,500.00 collected from the house they retained on. the
premises from July~ 1955; and the use of $1~975.00 paid on

.the Davis County case, March
-June

5~

5~ 1957~

and

$68~500400

from

1958t so that the attorneys did not participate in
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any interest 1n "''hich these sums would have earned as in..
terest from the dates received by the defendants to the
date of payment of the attorneys' fees.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's Findings of Fact~ Conclusions of La\v 1 and Judgment are fully
supported by the evidence and the la\v in the case.
The cases cited by the appellants:t when analyzed, support the judgment for the respondents. The instant case is
stronger than most cases previou:.-:;ly cited, for the reason
that in the instant case the parties at the outset contracted
kno\\ring that interest would be included in the amounts
recovered~ and the u~e of the plural ~'amounts recovered~~~
aod ~'any amount recoveredt~ clearly applied to amounts
paid by the State Road Commission in settlement of the
final judgmen t4

The judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed~

Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT B. MAW
WENDELL B. HAMMOND

GEORGE K. FADEL
Attorneys for pla·intif ts and respon.den ts.
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